Academic Freedom in the Wired World: Political Extremism, Corporate Power, and the University
By Robert M. O’Neil
Harvard University Press, 2008, 312 pages
Reviewed by George Leef.
Having Robert O’Neil write a book on academic freedom is a natural, about like having Tiger Woods write a book on how to play Augusta National. Although O’Neil certainly isn’t as famous as Woods, he has immersed himself in the study of academic freedom to the same degree that Tiger Woods has immersed himself in golf. O’Neil is the founder of the Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression, a professor of law at the University of Virginia, and a former president of that University. The depth of his knowledge about and his commitment to academic freedom is in evidence throughout the book.
Although Professor O’Neil covers the subject of academic freedom in great detail, the book leaves me somewhat dissatisfied. He is too eager to pronounce “ominous” – an overworked word in the book – a number of “threats” to academic freedom that seem rather inconsequential and stem from real disagreements rather than an effort to silence scholarly inquiry or expression. Also, I think he is too ready to dismiss complaints that some professors abuse their positions to indulge in ideological grandstanding that is far removed from the subject matter of the course. I’ll return to those shortcomings after discussing the bulk of O’Neil’s work.
First of all, what do we mean by “academic freedom?” O’Neil quotes the American Association of University Professors’ 1940 statement that a university professor is entitled to three things: “full freedom in research and in the publication of results…freedom in the classroom in discussing his subject matter…and when he speaks and writes as a citizen [freedom] from institutional censorship or discipline.” That’s certainly a workable definition of the core of academic freedom, but as the book shows, there are innumerable problems in deciding disputes at the periphery.
Why is academic freedom important? O’Neil’s answer is in this quotation from former Cornell president Frank Rhodes: “Free and open debate on a wide range of issues, however outrageous or offensive some of them may be, lies at the heart of the university community.” We want university professors to discover and transmit knowledge, but those functions are inhibited if they can be deterred or silenced. Sometimes academics say preposterous things – for example, the electrical engineering professor at Northwestern who denies that the Holocaust occurred – it is far better to attack error with counter-arguments and evidence than with reprisals.
That Northwestern case has important lessons for us. For more than 30 years, professor Arthur Butz (a competent professor of electrical engineering) has publicly espoused the view that the Holocaust is a myth. Despite calls that he be fired for beliefs that many find abhorrent, the Northwestern administration has refused to do so. It has, however, imposed two conditions on Professor Butz – that he must meet professional standards for teaching electrical engineering and that he must never bring up his views on the Holocaust in class. Thus, by contract, we have arrived at a mutually satisfactory result. Butz can say or write what he wants to, subject to time and place restrictions. O”Neil doesn’t seem troubled by this resolution, and shouldn’t be. Freedom of speech is not absolute and neither is academic freedom. Academic freedom isn’t a card that trumps all other rights and considerations, particularly those of institutions and students.
O’Neil readily admits that academic freedom does not face any McCarthy-like threats these days, so most of what he writes about – even the “ominous” cases – doesn’t seem especially troubling. Among the cases he covers, we hear about students grumbling about grades they’ve received, and about having to read or perform things that make them uncomfortable; about professors who complain about university policies restricting the use of email and computers and think that governmental restrictions on artistic funding impinges on their freedom. Even the post-9/11 cases were pretty tame. The University of New Mexico professor who said, “Anyone who can blow up the Pentagon gets my vote!” to his class was reprimanded, apologized sincerely, and retired a couple of years later. Ward Churchill was not dismissed by the University of Colorado because of his astoundingly mean and ignorant comments to the effect that the people killed on 9/11 deserved their fate, but because it was clearly shown that he had committed fraud and plagiarism.
Some of the thorniest cases arise where there is a conflict between the professor and the school over course material. When the University of Alabama asked a professor who taught a course in exercise physiology to refrain from bringing into the classroom brief mentions of his deeply-felt Christianity, he sued, claiming that the university was abridging his First Amendment rights, as well as academic freedom. This case raises the vexing issue of exactly where academic freedom resides – with the educator or with the institution that employs him? The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, but the court of appeals reversed. O’Neil provides a thoughtful discussion of the issues here. He doesn’t arrive at an easy answer to conflicts of this sort, writing, “Where the perceived transgression gives no warrant for dismissal or major sanction, a somewhat more restrained approach not only seems more appropriate, but it should also be adequate to meet institutional imperatives.” I have to agree – a “let’s try to be reasonable” attitude seems to be the best we can hope for.
Academic freedom is pretty well protected in America, but O’Neil finds some reasons to worry about it. I think that much of his concern is misplaced, however.
He begins his chapter “Bias, Balance, and Beyond” by noting that a few years ago a group of UCLA alumni offered briefly to pay students for recordings or transcripts of classes where professors showed bias or went badly off-topic to engage in inappropriate, politicized discussions. O’Neil is worried about “intrusive and worrisome forms of surveillance” like that, including the way Campus Watch keeps tabs on professors of Middle-Eastern Studies for anti-Israel bias. Such “surveillance” (an Orwellian term where a neutral word would have done) he fears might have a “chilling effect” on professors. That seems far-fetched. Outspoken professors are not likely to stop saying what they believe just because a group like Campus Watch is reporting on their actions. And even if they feel “chilled,” so what? Why should we be concerned only about freedom of expression for professors? Surely it would be permissible for another professor to highlight and take issue with the views of an anti-Israel (or pro-Israel, for that matter) professor, so why is it troubling for outside observers to do the same thing?
At the same time, O’Neil takes pains to downplay the concerns of many that some professors abuse their position to harangue students and attempt to indoctrinate them. He observes (correctly) that a number of instances of claimed bias have been shown to be unproven. That fact, however, doesn’t logically lead to the conclusion that there is no problem at all. Some professors openly and proudly admit that they use their classrooms as ideological soapboxes; I wrote about one such case here. Whether there are many or only a few professors who abuse their positions is beside the point. It shouldn’t be tolerated at all. It is no more an attack on academic freedom to demand that administrations rein in those who do that than it is for Northwestern to keep Professor Butz from wasting class time on his notions about the Holocaust.
Furthermore, O’Neil wants to extend academic freedom to cover controversies having nothing to do with the search for truth, especially affirmative action. He is sympathetic to the argument used by the University of Michigan in its affirmative action litigation that deciding which students to admit falls within the ambit of “academic freedom” and therefore should not be challenged by outsiders. As John Stossel would say, “Give me a break!” There is no reason to believe – notwithstanding the conjured up research by the university purporting to show “educational benefits” from campus diversity – that admitting students by racial quotas has any beneficial impact on student learning. Whether quotas, open or disguised, will be used in the admissions process at public universities is a policy question, not one of academic freedom.
Despite my disagreements with Professor O’Neil at those and other points, I still think this is an excellent book. People should think seriously about academic freedom. If its champion sometimes goes too far in its favor, that just provides the raw material for some good arguments.
George C. Leef is the vice president for research at the John William Pope Center for Higher Education Policy in Raleigh.